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PLATO,  PROTAGORAS  319a10- b1 
 
ejgw; ga;r tou'to, w\ Prwtagovra, oujk w[/mhn didakto;n ei\nai, soi; de; levgonti 
oujk e[cw o{pw" ªa]nº ajpistw'.  
“Denn ich war nicht der Auffassung, Protagoras, daß das lehrbar sei. 
Wenn du es aber sagst, sehe ich nicht, wie ich dir nicht glauben soll.” 
The text is that of John Burnet’s Oxford edition; the translation is Bernd 
Manuwald’s1. The deletion of a[n is due to Heindorf, who recognized that 
o{pw" a[n followed by the subjunctive is found only in final clauses and that 
the subjunctive here is deliberative2. Heindorf is undoubtedly correct, for 
which reason (among others) all subsequent editors have followed him. 
There is still a difficulty, however, with the text as emended. The logical 
implication of “I didn’t think X, but now that you say that X is the case there 
is no way I can disbelieve you” is “I now think that X is the case”. But in the 
very next sentence the speaker, Socrates, offers to explain why he does not 
now think that X is the case: o{qen de; aujto; hJgou'mai [n.b.] ouj didakto;n 
ei\nai mhd∆ uJp∆ ajnqrwvpwn paraskeuasto;n ajnqrwvpoi", divkaiov" eijmi eijpei'n. 
He goes on to argue (319b-320b), first, that the practice of the Athenians, 
who are widely reputed to be especially wise, shows that they do not believe 
that arete can be taught and, second, that prominent individual Athenians 
have not in fact managed to teach their own sons the arete that they 
themselves possess. Socrates concludes his speech by reiterating his 
conviction that arete is not teachable (oujc hJgou'mai [n.b.] didakto;n ei\nai 
ajrethvn, 320b4-5), but at the same time noting, as he did at the start of his 
speech, that he finds it difficult to reject the wisdom and authority of 
Protagoras, who holds that it is indeed teachable. Socrates therefore invites 
his interlocutor to demonstrate (ejpidei'xai... ejpivdeixon, 320b8-c1) the 
teachability of arete, an invitation that Protagoras gladly accepts (ejpideivxw, 
320c3). It is only after the sophist’s lengthy exposition that Socrates finally 
 
1 Burnet 1903; Manuwald 1999, 24.  Likewise Hubbard-Karnofsky 1984, 14 (“I didn’t 
think that this was something which could be taught.  But now that you say it is, I don’t know 
what to do but take your word for it”) and Guthrie 1956, 50 (“The fact is, I did not think this 
was something that could be taught, though when you say otherwise I cannot doubt your 
word”). I should like to thank my colleagues Kirk Sanders and Marina Terkourafi for their 
helpful comments. 
2 Heindorf 1810, 497, comparing Men. 91d2 oujk e[cw o{pw" soi pisteuvsw and Euthphr. 
11b6-7 oujk e[cw e[gwge o{pw" soi ei[pw, cf. also Lg. 696d7 oujk e[cw o{p  w" ei[pw, Hp. mi. 
376b7 oujk e[cw o{pw" soi sugcwrhvsw, Euthd. 307a1-2 oujk e[cw o{pw" protrevpw, Phd. 107a8-
9 oujd∆ aujto;" e[cw e[ti o{ph/ ajpistw', Phdr. 241a7-b1 ou[q∆ o{pw"... ejmpedwvsh/ e[cei, R. 368b4 
ou[te ga;r o{pw" bohqw' e[cw. For this manner of expressing the impossibility of disbelief or 
noncompliance, see PV 640 oujk oi\d∆ o{pw" uJmi'n ajpisth'saiv me crhv, Thuc. 1.91.1 oujk ei\con 




professes (328e1-3) to be satisfied that he was mistaken in thinking that 
arete could not be taught: ejgw; ga;r ejn me;n tw'/ e[mprosqen crovnw/ hJgouvmhn 
[n.b.] oujk ei\nai ajnqrwpivnhn ejpimevleian h|/ ajgaqoi; oiJ ajgaqoi; givgnontai: 
nu'n de; pevpeismai. 
The context, then, shows that Socrates cannot at 319a10 say that he did 
not think (oujk w[/mhn) that arete could be taught. There are two 
circumstances in which one can say “I did not think X”, neither of which is 
the case here: when one no longer thinks X, as at 328e1-3, or when one’s 
present view of the validity of X is no longer relevant. The former 
circumstance is illustrated, for example, at Apology 36a4, where Socrates 
says that he did not think (ouj ga;r wj/ovmhn) that the vote to condemn him 
would be as close as it turned out in fact to be. Similarly, at Gorgias 499c2-4 
Socrates tells Callicles that he did not think at the start of the conversation 
(oujk w[/mhn ge kat∆ ajrcav") that he would be subjected to deliberate 
deception, but now he sees that he was mistaken (nu'n de; ejyeuvsqhn). 
Likewise, at Gorgias 497c4 Socrates congratulates Callicles on having been 
initiated into the greater mysteries before having been initiated into the 
lesser, something that he had not thought was permissible (oujk w[/mhn 
qemito;n ei\nai). The “mysteries” in question are metaphorical, but that has 
no bearing on the logic or the grammar of the passage. The other 
circumstance in which one can say “I did not think X”, namely when the 
speaker’s current views regarding X are no longer pertinent, is illustrated by 
a passage in the Seventh Letter. At 347e4-5 the author of the letter explains 
that he stopped discussing Dion’s affairs with Dionysius because he no 
longer thought there was anything to be gained by doing so (oujde;n ga;r e[ti 
plevon w[/mhn poiei'n). The verb is imperfect indicative not because the writer 
has now changed his mind about the advisability of conducting 
conversations with Dionysius, but merely to explain the frame of mind that 
caused him to act as he did at the time. 
There are, then, two problems with the text of Protagoras 319a10-b1 as 
transmitted in our manuscripts: the logic of oujk w[/mhn is at odds with the 
context and the word a[n has intruded into a construction in which it does not 
belong3. It is, however, always a useful principle that two problems are 
better than one. For a consideration of the one might provide a solution to 
both. And such, I believe, is the case here. I suggest that Socrates said oujk 
a]n w[/mhn didakto;n ei\nai, soi; de; levgonti oujk e[cw o{pw" ajpistw', “I should 
 
3 Nor is it immediately apparent what the cause of the intrusion might have been. 
Manuwald (1999, 158) alone among commentators suggests an explanation, namely that a[n 
may have been inserted “wegen des kurz zuvor gebrauchten o{pw"... a[n (319a1 f.)”. But that 
was ten lines earlier and involved a[n with the optative (twice). 
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not have thought that it was teachable, but I do not know how I can doubt 
you when you say that it is”. That is, a[n has been displaced from the one 
place in the sentence where it makes good sense to another, where it is 
ungrammatical. The particle a[n is very frequently omitted in one or more of 
the manuscripts of Plato4. What would seem to have happened, then, is that 
a[n was accidentally omitted from the ancestor of our manuscripts and then 
added later, perhaps in the margin. Subsequently, it was unthinkingly 
inserted in an adjacent line, o{pw" a[n being so common a combination that 
the scribe was tempted to believe that this was where it belonged. If Burnet’s 
text of Republic 352e-353a represents accurately what Plato intended, 
something exactly comparable seems to have occurred there: at 352e9 all 
manuscripts read a[n, which Burnet deletes, following a suggestion by James 
Adam; at 353a1 manuscripts ADM omit the a[n which is preserved only by 
Stobaeus and manuscript F. That is, manuscripts ADM preserve the particle 
in a place that is separated from the place where, according to Burnet, it 
belongs by a distance of 42 letters. If my proposal regarding Protagoras 
319a10-b1 is correct, the distance is 39 letters. This would be consistent with 
A. C. Clark’s suggestions that the ancestors of the main manuscripts of 
Protagoras, BTW, had between 35 and 50 letters per line5. 
The sentence now conveys, what the context requires, that Socrates 
claims to be confronted with a dilemma, namely his difficulty in reconciling 
his conviction that arete cannot be taught with his respect for the wisdom of 
Protagoras, who holds that it can be taught. In the same way I might humor a 
colleague who sought to convince me that the Homeric Hymn to Demeter 
was a modern forgery by saying, “I shouldn’t have thought it possible that it 
could be the product of fraud, but I don’t know how I can doubt so eminent a 
scholar as yourself”. I might then, like Socrates, go on to explain why I do 
not, in fact, believe that the hymn was fabricated in the modern era. 
The construction that is here proposed finds an exact parallel, not with 
oi\mai but with dokei', at the start of Pericles’ funeral oration (Thuc. 2.35.1): 
ejmoi; de; ajrkou'n a]n ejdovkei ei\nai ajndrw'n ajgaqw'n e[rgw/ genomevnwn e[rgw/ 
 
4 In Burnet’s text I find the following instances: Euthphr. 13d9, Cri. 53c8, Phd. 93a8, 
93b1, Prm. 160a1, Smp. 221e3, Phdr. 232c2, 239b8, Alc. I 134e8, Alc. II 143b2, La. 187e10, 
Men. 89b4, 97c9, 100b3, Hp. Ma. 290e9, 295a5, R. 352c3, 353a1, 386c1, 457d9, 586c8. I do 
not record the many cases where one or more editors have inserted the word, under the 
conviction that it has been omitted from all the manuscripts. 
5 Clark 1918: the ancestor of B had between 40 and 50 letters per line (402), of T about 35 
per line (411-13), of W about 43 per line (417). Similarly, according to Boter 1989, 92, an 
ancestor of manuscript D (which does not contain Prot.) “had about 45 letters per line”; 
compare the omission of 42 letters, not readily attributable to corruption arising from saut du 




kai; dhlou'sqai ta;" timav", “I should have thought it sufficient, in the case of 
men who demonstrated their valor in deed, to pay them public tribute in deed 
as well”, that is, “I should not have thought it necessary to supplement 
public action with public speaking”. Pericles does not want to say, 
particularly in the course of delivering a funeral oration, that he considers 
the practice of delivering funeral orations a bad idea, although that is 
precisely what his words convey.6 His proem indulges in a variety of 
standard rhetorical strategies. One is that the magnitude of the accomplish-
ments to be memorialized is beyond the capacity of mere words to convey. 
Another is the way in which a speaker surreptitiously enhances appreciation 
for his rhetorical skill by affecting to minimize either his experience or his 
suitability for the task or, as here, his conviction that the speech is even 
necessary: the hearer is invited to imagine what a magnificent oration the 
speaker could have produced under ideal circumstances, given how skillfully 
he has managed at present. So here, Pericles devotes the opening paragraph 
of his speech to an enumeration of the reasons he appears reluctant to speak7, 
concluding his introductory remarks by saying that, since the practice of 
delivering a funeral oration is approved by longstanding custom, he is 
obliged to adhere to custom and make an attempt (crh; kai; ejme; eJpovmenon tw'/ 
novmw/ peira'sqai..., 2.35.3). Pericles thus expresses his criticism of age-old 
tradition, suggesting reasons for his belief that the custom is superfluous, in 
the same way that Socrates, at Protagoras 319a10-b1, cautiously challenges 
a distinguished visitor’s firmly held conviction that arete can be taught. 
This use of a secondary tense of the indicative with a[n is generally 
designated “past potential”8. It is especially common with verbs of thinking 
or perceiving, in which connection Schwyzer describes it as “formelhaft”9. 
Indeed, Plutarch cites to; “oujk a]n w[/mhn” (De tranquill. an. 474e) as one of 
the stereotypical expressions that the man who is fully prepared for the 
vicissitudes of fortune can dispense with. Still, the status of this past 
potential construction has, with some justification, been questioned, and it 
 
6 Rhodes (1988, 218) notes, “here Pericles is made to carry awareness of the difficulty [of 
the speaker’s task] to the point of doubting the desirability of the custom”. Marchant (1891, 
ad loc.) comments: “censeam, often instead of censeo, as a polite expression ‘I am inclined to 
think’; if I had to settle the matter I should hold”; cf. Classen-Steup’s explanatory eij ejmoi; 
movnw/ krivnein ejxh'n (1914, ad loc.). 
7 For a discussion of the topoi involved, see especially Krischer 1977. 
8 Rusten 1989, 140 (ad Thuc. 2.35.1), referring to Smyth 1956, §1784 and Kühner-Gerth I 
212 and comparing 2.49.5 h{distav te a]n ej" u{dwr yucro;n sfa'" aujtou;" rJivptein, where the 
present infinitive represents an imperfect indicative (but this type is better analyzed as 
iterative; see Wakker 2006, 169). 
9 Schwyzer 1950, 347. 
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will be worth while to discuss it briefly here. To begin with, the other 
expressions that Plutarch cites, as parallel to oujk a]n w[/mhn, are indicative 
expressions with no modal particle (to; “a[ll∆ h[lpizon” kai; to; “tau't∆ ouj 
prosedovkwn”), that is, leaving open the possibility that the particle in oujk 
a]n w[/mhn relates not to the verb next to which it appears but to the infinitive 
to be supplied10. And a great many of the instances of “past potential” 
indicatives with a[n cited in the grammars involve verbs whose subject is 
either indefinite ti" or a generalized second-person singular, corresponding 
to Latin videres, putares or the like. In the most careful and thorough 
examination of this phenomenon, Gerry Wakker has concluded that, “in fact, 
only stereotyped cases such as w[/eto a[n ti" (‘one might have thought’) are 
possibly real past potentials”, while those instances usually described as past 
potentials “can in virtually all cases also be interpreted as a counter-
factual”11. Wakker’s analysis of the situation is convincing, but she leaves 
one issue unresolved, namely the matter of why a speaker or writer might 
choose to employ a construction of this type. For there is a certain 
illogicality in representing as contrary-to-fact something that one regards as 
being in fact the case. As we have seen, Edgar Marchant provided a 
counterfactual interpretation of Thucydides 2.35.1 (above, n. 6), in effect 
having Pericles say, “If I had to settle the matter I should judge the practice 
of delivering funeral orations to be superfluous”. But the matter is not for 
Pericles to settle, and Pericles’ subsequent words make it clear that he is 
leaving open the possibility that he did not, and perhaps still does not, regard 
the practice of delivering funeral orations a necessary element in the 
honoring of those who died honorably in battle. Why, then, does he express 
himself in such a way that he might be interpreted as saying, “If I had to 
settle the matter, I should believe X”, one possible implication of which is, 
“Since I am in no position to settle the matter, I do not believe X”? 
There is a similar use of an imperfect indicative with a[n in a fragment of 
Cratinus’ Boukoloi (fr. 17 K.-A.), the entire text of which reads as follows: 
o}" oujk e[dwk∆ aijtou'nti Sofoklevei corovn, 
tw'/ Kleomavcou d∆, o}n oujk a]n hjxivoun ejgwv 
ejmoi; didavskein oujd∆ a]n eij" ∆Adwvnia. 
 
10 For other instances of this first-person expression with the dependent infinitive left to 
be expressed, see E. Alc. 1088, Men. Epit. 369, PCG Adesp. 1017.18 K.-A., Polyb. 10.32.12; 
for third-person ti" a]n w[/eto, X. An. 1.5.8, HG 5.3.20. For the tendency of a[n to gravitate 
toward second position in its clause, see the copious documentation in Wackernagel 1955, 
62–70. 
11 Wakker 1994, 166; see also Wakker 2006. A similar conclusion is reached by Pearson 
(1903, 201-202, ad E. Hel. 587, approving the conjecture a{m∆ for the transmitted a[n). Neither 




“who did not grant a chorus to Sophocles when he applied, but granted one 
to the son of Cleomachus12, whom I shouldn’t have thought worthy of 
producing a play for me, even at the Adonia.” 
There can be no question of the (repeated) modal particle going with the 
infinitive didavskein rather than with the imperfect indicative hjxivoun, as that 
construction with ajxiw' is not found13. It is not entirely clear how to take 
ejmoi; didavskein in the last line. Douglas Olson (2007, 177) translates, “to 
serve as my didavskalo", my trainer,” but goes on to note, “but the term is 
routinely used of the poet..., whether he trained the chorus himself or not”. 
One could interpret the lines as a counterfactual statement by taking ejmoiv to 
mean, “if I were archon”. The implication, then, might be, “But I am not (or 
“was not”) archon, therefore it is not (or “was not”) the case that I think 
Gnesippus unworthy14. But it is clear that the speaker thinks Gnesippus 
unworthy of having his plays performed at the Adonia, not to mention at the 
Dionysia. 
Another passage from fifth-century drama tells a similar story. In 
Euripides’ Iphigenia in Tauris, Iphigeneia expresses her unwillingness to 
believe that Artemis, the goddess who refuses to accept sacrifices from those 
who are polluted by contact with murder or childbirth, herself demands 
human sacrifice (380-384). The priestess of Artemis continues (385-386): 
oujk e[sq∆ o{pw" e[teken a]n hJ Dio;" davmar / Lhtw; tosauvthn ajmaqivan, “There 
is no way Zeus’ consort Leto would have bred such a monstrous incon-
sistency”. Pearson (1903, 202) considers the text corrupt and believes that 
Porson’s e[tikten should be read in place of e[teken a[n. As far as I am aware, 
however, every editor in the last hundred years has retained a[n. Pearson 
objects to the supposed past potential, but here too it is possible to interpret 
the lines as implicitly counterfactual, presupposing a proposition of the form, 
“If X had been the case, Leto would surely not have bred such a monstrous 
inconsistency,” one possible implication of which would be, “But X was not 
 
12 I.e. the tragic poet Gnesippus; cf. fr. 276 K.-A. The reading Kleomavcou is Dobree’s 
correction of Kleomavcw/, the reading of the manuscript of Athenaeus. 
13 For the repeated a[n, which “is especially frequent in the quasi-spoken language of the 
fifth century, i.e. tragedy and Old Comedy” (Slings 1992, 102), compare Anaxagoras fr. 6.5-6 
D.-K. oujk a]n duvnaito cwrisqh'nai, oujd∆ a]n ejf∆ eJautou' genevsqai, S. El. 697 duvnait∆ a]n oujd∆ 
a]n ijscuvwn fugei'n, Eupolis fr. 219.1 K.-A. ou}" d∆ oujk a]n ei{lesq∆ oujd∆ a]n oijnovpta" pro; tou', 
Ar. Nu. 118 = 1250 oujk a]n ajpodoivhn oujd∆ a]n ojbolo;n oujdeniv, 425 oujd∆ a]n dialecqeivhn g∆ 
ajtecnw'" toi'" a[lloi" oujd∆ a]n ajpantw'n, Pax 1223 oujk a]n priaivmhn oujd∆ a]n ijscavdo" mia'". 
14 Counterfactual conditions with an imperfect indicative can have either present or past 
reference (Wakker 1994, 146-150). 
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the case, and so Leto did give birth to so great an inconsistency”15. But in the 
immediately following lines (386-390) Iphigeneia says in no uncertain terms 
that she believes that the mortal inhabitants of the region have attributed 
their own moral failings to the goddess. In other words, she is convinced that 
Leto did not give birth to so great an inconsistency. 
What the passages we have been discussing have in common is that they 
all represent disagreements with or criticisms of authorities: ancestral 
Athenian custom (Thuc. 2.35.1), the eponymous archon of Athens (Cratinus 
fr. 17 K.-A.), Tauric ritual practices carried out in the name of the goddess 
Artemis (E. IT 385-86) and the distinguished visiting sophist Protagoras (Pl. 
Prt. 319a10-b1). In each instance, the disagreement would have taken the 
form, if expressed bluntly and directly, of a statement containing or implying 
a negative: “funeral orations are not necessary”, “Gnesippus is not worthy”, 
“Artemis does not require human sacrifice”, “arete is not teachable”. But in 
each instance the speaker employs a similar array of politeness strategies to 
serve as a pragmatic hedge, in order to soften the criticism, thereby reducing 
the potential threat to the “face” of the addressee16. One of those strategies is 
known as “Neg-Raising”, or the application of a negative to a matrix verb 
rather than to a subordinate verb, with which it seems more logically to 
belong, as in “I don’t think your reasoning is valid” as opposed to “I think 
your reasoning is not valid”17. Another such strategy, seen in Pl. Prt. 
319a10-b1 if my proposed reading is correct, is the use of a past-tense 
indicative verb accompanied by the modal particle a[n, a construction 
normally used to express a counterfactual condition referring either to the 
past or the present. This is one of the many attested strategies, found in 
several languages, for minimizing the potential threat to the “face” of an 
addressee, strategies which include the use of modal verbal expressions, 
hypotheticals or counterfactuals18. And that would seem to be the case with 
the instances we have been considering. While they are not fully expressed 
 
15 It might appear that the “emphatic periphrastic negation” (Mastronarde 2002, 199, ad E. 
Med. 171) oujk e[sq∆ o{pw" is incompatible with the uncertainty or indefiniteness of a 
conditional or potential expression, but the locution is elsewhere found in such circumstances: 
Ar. Av. 628, V. 212, Pl. Euthphr. 15d4-5, La. 184c2-3, Smp. 223a3-4, Isoc. 11.5, 12.156, 250, 
269, 15.206. 
16 Marchant (above, note 6) long ago invoked politeness in connection with Thuc. 2.35.1. 
Since that time, considerable attention has been paid to politeness strategies in discourse, the 
standard work on politeness theory being Brown-Levinson 1987. See Lloyd 2006 for a terse 
and lucid statement of the basics of the theory and for application to the work of a Classical 
author (Sophocles). 
17 For Neg-Raising, see Prince 1976, Horn 1978. 




as contrary-to-fact conditions, they suggest that some conditional clause is to 
be supplied, which would render them counterfactual. One of the passages 
that Michael Lloyd (2006, 236) cites as illustration of this type of “indirect 
formulation” of criticism is Haemon’s address to Creon (S. Ant. 755): eij mh; 
path;r h\sq∆, ei\pon a]n s∆ oujk eu\ fronei'n, “If you were not my father, I 
would say that you were lacking in good sense”. But Creon is his father, and 
Haemon does consider his father to be lacking in good sense, as is clear from 
his penultimate word in the play (maivnh/, 765). By expressing himself 
counterfactually, however, he enables one possible interpretation of his 
sentence as conveying the implication, “But as it is you are my father, and so 
I would not say that you are lacking in good sense”. That is not, of course, 
what Haemon means, nor is it intended to deceive his father. Rather, it is an 
accepted – although illogical – means of directing criticism against someone 
whose status makes criticism problematic. 
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